Suab Hmong Broadcasting

Lub neej nyob asmeslibkas yog ib lub neej khwv heev, tsis tau so txaus thiab tsis muaj sij hawm ntau mus ncig ua si kom dim pa tawm ntawm txoj kev khwv ua hauj lwm. Nyob rau lub xyoo kawg ntawm 2007 thiab pib ntawm 2008, kuv tau mus cig ua si nyob rau sab teb chaws los tsuas thiab sab teb chaws thaib tau 20 hnub tom qab ntawm kev ua hauj lwm tiad rau ntawm 3 hnub nyob rau sab Es-Xias. Kev mus cig zaum no kuj tau ntsib coob tug cov phooj ywg los sab asmeslibkas los thiab cov nyob rau hauv teb chaws thaib.

Teb Chaws Los Tsuas:
Kev kag mus rau teb chaws los tsuas zaum no pom tau tias tsis muaj dab tsis cov nyom li cas. Tsoom hwv los tsuas ntsuam xyuas tso cai Vib-Xaj (Visa) kag teb chaws los tsuas zoo li yav tas los xwb thiab. Neeg los lwm lub teb chaws los ncig ua si los kuj coob huj sim, los dhau dhud yam tsis tu ncua. Tu siab zog tias lub caij kuv mus txog rau teb chaws los tsuas tau lig zog lawm, kev noj tsiab peb caug twb muab xaus tas lawm. Kuv tau nrog cov kwv tij phooj ywg tham txog lub tsiab peb caug xyoo no, lawd tau hais tias xyoo no tsis tshua muaj Hmoob asmeslibkas los coob li txhia niaj txhia xyoo lawm.

Qhov chaws muag khoom sawv ntxov hu tias Taj Laj Xaub (Morning Market) yog ib lub khws nyob rau nruab nrab thiab nyob ncaj kev hauv nroog tuam nceeb Vees Cas. Xyoo 2007 kawg no lawd tsim tau ib lub chaws muag khoom sab hauv tsev puab ntawm qhov chaws muag khoom sawv ntxov no. Nyob rau sab hauv muaj cua txia thiab zoo ib yam li tej khw, Mall, nyob rau teb chaws asmeslibkas no thiab.

Nyob hauv nroog Vees Cas yog muaj ob qhov chaws loj mus cig xws li Thaj Luam thiab Pab Tus Xais. Pab Tus Xais yog lub npe tshiab tim dua ho lub npe qub hu ua As Nub Xam Vab Lis. Qhov chaws ua si no muaj tib neeg tuaj ua si yuav luag txhua txhua hnub. Muaj peb cov Hmoob tuaj ua si dhau dhu mus los tib yam.

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Qhov chaws muag khoom loj hu tias Ais Tej (ITECC) yog mus ntawm qhov chaws ua si Thaj Luam mus rau sab qab teb hnub tuaj yog tsav tsheb lib 10 feeb, qhov chaws no lawd qhib muaj caij thiab yog ib lub chaws muag khoom loj (Mall). Kev hu nkauj ua si xws li concert tej ntawd yog muaj ua nyob rau ntawm qhov chaws no tsis tu ncua thiab. 

Yog koj xauj tsheb tsav mus ib qhov rau ib qhov, tus nqi xauj tsheb rau ib hnub twg yog raug ib cheeb tsam li ntawm 30 mus rau 50 daus las. Koj xauj raws ntawm cov chaws so, hotel, los tau tib yam. Tsis yog li ntawd, yog koj ua tau siab loj, koj xauj lauv cav, motorcycle, tsav los tau tib yam. Tus nqi pheej yig zog.

Tom qab nyob thiab ncig 10 hnub hauv teb chaws los tsuas uas yog mus ntsib tej kwv tij neej tsa, kuv tau tawm los mus ncig rau sab teb chaws thaib. Lub hom phiaj yog mus koom Hmoob Thaib lub tsiab peb caug, vim Hmoob Thaib hom noj lawv li tsiab peb caug rau lub 1 hli ntuj hnub tim 9 xyoo 2008.


Mekong River view from Laos to Thailand


Teb Chaws Thaib:
Kev mus ib qho rau ib qho hauv teb chaws Thaib kuj yog yooj yim xws li ya dav hlau ib cheeb tsam li ntawm 45 feeb rau 1 teed ces yeej mus txog rau lwm lub nroog lawm. Zaum no kuv thiaj xav tias cia sim ho mus tsheb loj hauv av seb ho zoo li cas. Kev hla sab teb chaws los tsuas los mus rau thaib teb yog muaj ib lub tsheb BAV (Bus) tawm hauv tuam ceeb vees-cas mus txog ntua rau tuam ceeb Bas-Kauj (BangKok). Tus nqi yog 600 Baj rau ib tug tib neeg. Yog xam nyiaj asmeslibkas rau lub caij ntawd yog raug 18.00 daus-las. Kuv tau los hauv lub tsheb BAV no los ib hmo kaj tug ces los txog rau hauv nroog tuam ceeb bas-kauj. Lub tsheb BAV no yog hom BAV muaj chaws zoo zaum thiab yog muaj ob theem chaws rau neeg zaum; theem saum toj thiab theem hauv qab. Thaum los txog rau hauv lub nroog bas-kauj, kuv tau los so rau hauv lub tsev so hu tias The Bangkok City Suite. Lub tsev so no tus nqi so yog 18 rau 20 daus-las rau ib hmo twg. Lub tsev so no yog nyob rau hauv nruab nrab hauv nroog bas-kauj thiab nyob ze rau tej khw muag khoom loj thiab chaws ua si Vat Phabkiab (Wat Pra Keo). Mus ncig tom tej khws xws li Pab-Tus-Nab (Pratu Num), Xab-Yam (Siam Mall), MBK, Pham Tid (Phan Tip), thiab lwm qhov los kuj yooj yim heev. Mus kaw taw xwb los yeej tau lawm tsis caij tsheb los tau. Yog caij tsheb fais fab (BTS) los kuj nyob ze rau ib cheeb tsam ntawm thiab. Nyob hauv lub tsev so no, lawd muaj kag tau mus Is-Taws-Nev (Internet) dawb yog tias koj nqa koj lub laptop. Yog koj tsis muaj laptop, lawd pub koj siv Is-Taws-Ned (Internet) dawb 30 feeb rau ib hnub twg. Muaj neeg tawd dawb, neeg suav, thiab cov neeg los txawd teb chaws los so coob. Thaum sawv ntxov lawd kuj muaj khoom noj dawb (breakfast buffet) uas yog muaj ntau yam khoom noj rau koj xaiv noj.

Kev ya dav hlau ntawm nroog tuam ceeb bas-kauj mus rau nroog tsheej-maim yog raug tus nqi ib cheeb tsam li ntawm 35 daus-las rau ib tug tib neeg twg. Sij hawm yog siv li ntawm 55 feeb. Thaum mus txog rau ntawm lub nroog tsheej-maim, kuv tau mus so rau ntawm lub tsev so hu tias Top North Hotel. Tus nqi ntawm lub tsev so no yog raug 20.00 daus-las rau ib hmo twg. Lub tsev so no kuj yog nyob rau hauv nruab nrab nroog Tsheej-Maim tib yam thiab muaj chaws da dej ua si nraum zoov (swimming pool) thiab muaj cov neeg tawd dawb so coob huj si. Kev mus cig tej khw loj los kuj nyob ze ib ncig thiab xws li khw muag khoom hmo ntuj Nais Phab Xaj (night bazaar) thiab khw loj, Central mall. Thaum mus txog rau lub nroog Tsheej Maim, kuv tau hu kom ib tug tij laug Hmoob nyob rau ntawm lub zos Houy Seo (Huab Xiaj) tuaj coj kuv mus ua si. Tus tij laug no muaj lub npe hu tias Yias yog xeem Yaj. Muaj lus ua nws tsaug ntau ntau rau nws lub siab zoo thiab siab dawb paug uas tau coj kuv mus ncig ua si yam txaus siab hlo. Nws tuaj tom kuv thiab coj kuv mus ua si yam txaus siab hro; kuv tau mus ncig txog rau lub chaws Duas Xub Thej (Doi Soo Tep), yog ib qhov chaws nyob deb ntawm nroog Tsheej Maim tsav tsheb mus li 45 feeb mus rau saum roob siab (saib duab hauv qab no). Thaum mus txog nrau ntawm Doi Soo Tep no pom muaj ncoob tus me nyuam Hmoob muaj hnub nyoog li 5 mus rau 10 xyoo hnav ris tsho Hmoob tuaj nyob thov nyiaj raws tus ntaiv nce mus rau saum lub vaj. Dua ntawd kuj muaj neeg tuaj ncig ua si ncoob kawg nkaus. Tom qab ncig ua si me ntsi ntawm Doi Soo Tep, kuv tau hla mus rau Hmoob ib lub zos hu tias Doi Pui. Lub zos no nyob deb ntawm Doi Soo Tep tsav tsheb mus li 30 feeb rau sab hnub poob siab. Lub zos Doi Pui no yog Hmoob ib lub zos uas lawd muag khoom yog yam lawd khwv los pab rau lawd lub neej xwb. Lawd cog paj thiab muaj ntau qhov chaws ncig ua si nyob ze ntawm lub zos no. Tej qhov chaws lawd sau nqi kag tab sis yog tias koj yog Hmoob lawm no ces lawd tsis sau tus nqi kag.

Hmoob lub zos Houay Seo (Huab Xiaj) mus tsheb ntawm lub nroog Tsheej Maim mus yog ib cheeb tsam li 30 rau 45 feeb, muaj li ntawm 40 tawm yim Hmoob nyob. Kuv tau mus koom lawd lub tsiab peb caug nyob rau lub 1 hli ntuj hnub tim 9 xyoo 2008. Saib duab hauv qab no. Cov zos Hmoob nyob ib cig ntawm lub nroog Tsheej Maim no, lub zos no nyob ze nroog Tsheej Maim dua ntais. Kev lom zem ntawm lub zos rau lub tsiab peb caug 2008 no kuj muaj kev txais tos cov nom tswv Thaib thiab muaj sib tw ntau tuj lub.

Lub tsiab peb caug loj xyoo 2008 no yog muaj sib koom ntawm 12 lub zos nyob rau ntawm lub zos hu tias Chan Khiang (Tshaj Khias) yog mus tsheb ntawm lub nroog Tsheej Maim mus ib cheeb tsam li ntawm 1 teev ntau. Saib duab hauv qab no. Vim xyoo 2008 no, huab tais Thaib tus muam hlob tau tam sim neej los ncav rau lub caij tsoom Hmoob lub tsiab peb caug, txoj cai yog tsis pub muaj kev lom zem tom qab 15 hnub ntawm huab tais tsev neeg yog muaj ib tug puv 120 xyoo, ces Hmoob tej kev lom zem sib tw ntxhais zoo nkauj thiab hu nkauj hmo ntuj tau muab hlood mus ua rau lub 1 hli ntuj tom qab ntawm tim 20 rov saum. Lub sij hawm ntawd kuv ho tau rov los tsev lawm ces kuj ho mus koom tsis tau.

Lub caij kuv nyob rau teb chaws thaib, kev pauv nyiaj yog 1 daus las pauv tau 32 baj nyiaj thaib.

Kev qhia (tips):
1. Kev yuav khoom ris tsho pheej yig nyob hauv nroog tuam nceeb Bas Kauj yog muaj nyob rau ntawm qhov chaws muag khoom hu tias Pab Tus Nab (Pratu Num). Nyob rau ob hnub so (weekend) yog nyob rau ntawm qhov chaws muag khoom hu tias Chav Tub Chav (Chatuchak). Ob qhov chaws no yog muaj muag khoom ris tsho hnav pheej yig heev. Lub caij koj mus yuav khoom ris tsho hnav, koj cav kom muab tus nqi muag nqis los pheej yig zog tau tib yam.
2. Nqa nyiaj mus siv yog nqa daim 100 daus las yuav pauv tau nyiaj Thaib thiab nyiaj los tsuas ntau zog. Nco ntsood nqa cov nyiaj kom tshiab thiab zoo nkauj. Tej qhov chaws pauv nyiaj yog daim nyiaj ib nyuag qub zog lawd yuav tsis kam pauv.
3. Nco ntsood, yog mus ncig ua si, txawm nyob hauv nroog thiab tawm mus rau sab nrauv los yuav tau yuav ob peb pob ntawv siv lub caij mus thaij hauv hoob nab (restroom). Feem ntau tej chaws so tso zi (restroom) tsis muaj ntawv siv li peb nyob rau teb chaws asmeslibkas.
4. Yog nyob hauv lub nroog Bas Kauj, kev mus los, caij tib co tsheb hu tias Taxi Meter. Nco ntsood saib kom tus tsav tsheb nyem tus nqi tsheb kom pib ua ntej yuav mus ib qhov rau ib qhov. Yog nws tsis nyem tus nqi tsheb kom pib, qhov nod qhia tau tias nws yuav pib khuj koj. Thaum mus txog chaws, tsuas them raws tus nqi tau khiav hauv lub tsheb xwb. Yog koj yuav maum kiag xws li mus kev deb, tus nqi maum ib hnub twg nyob rau ib cheeb tsam 1200 rau 1500 Baj ntxiv rau nqi roj uas yog yus yog tus them thiab.
5. Lub caij 10 hli txog rau 2 hli, huab cua nyob rau teb chaws Thaib thiab Los Tsuas zoo heev. So thiab no txog ib cheeb tsam li ntawm 60 thiab 80 degree. Sab qaum nteb xws li Tsheej Maim thiab teb chaws los tsuas, huab cua zoo dua nyob yav Bas Kauj.
6. Kev siv nyiaj nyob noj, teb chaws los tsuas kim zog nyob rau teb chaws thaib. Yog yuav mus ua si nyob li 2 lub lim tiam, nqa nyiaj ib cheeb tsam li 2000 rau 3000 daus las xwb ces yeej txaus siv lawm yog tias tsis muaj chaws siv ntau yam.


Central Bangkok City, Petchabury Road in Pratu-Num market

Kuv tau tsim tau ib daim DVD hu tias “Ncig Teb Chaws Thaib” muaj ntau yam kev qhia (Tips). Yog koj xav paub ntau tshaj qhov no ntxiv thiab txaus siab pab yuav daim DVD no, sau tau email rau kuv tau rau This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

Kev mus ncig ua si li no yog ib qhov zoo ua kom yus tej kev nyuaj siab, ntxhov siab, ploj mus me ntsis.

Yog koj muaj lus nug li cas txog kev mus ncig ua si rau teb chaws Thaib thiab Los Tsuas, ho sau email rau kuv tau rau ntawm This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

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In 1962, with few viable options, President John E Kennedy asked the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to find people in Laos who valued their independence enough to resist the North Vietnamese encroachment into their country.

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With that order, two agents contacted the Hmong, recounted former CIA chief William E. Colby to a small group of mainly Hmong students who had gathered at the Georgetown Hmong Youth Conference.
The events Colby spoke of transpired some thirty years ago during the time of their parents, long before any of these students had been born. So appropriately enough, it was in this room at Georgetown University last April-surrounded by the very children of transplanted Hmong veterans the CIA recruited to fight the "secret war" in Laos-that Colby's long, distinguished life came full circle.

No one knew it at the time but unfortunately, this would be Colby's last public speaking engagement. just three weeks after filling in important gaps in the formation of the CIA's relationship with these students' parents, Colby was found dead in the Potomac River, the victim of a ruptured aneurysm.

As one of the less than twenty people present at his last speech, it was a true pleasure to meet the man and to have him place the Laotian war into the larger context of the worldwide conflict in Southeast Asia. The following analysis presents parts of Colby's speech along with other evidence that will help clarify the conflict in Laos and the Hmong role.

As with the Hmong, the Vietnam War remains a traumatic period in history for many Americans. The aftershocks of the American effort to contain communism in Southeast Asia continue to be felt to this day. in just two decades, a whole new community with an ancient culture was transplanted from one world to another. Twenty years ago, many Americans would not have known who a "Hmong" person was.

Today, the Hmong inhabit all regions of the United States - and all five continents.

For the Hmong people, the drama in Laos remains at the center of attention. Fighting the secret war in Laos forced the Hmong to assume many roles and identities; from highland farmers they became guerrilla warfare specialists, then refugees fleeing genocide and finally the Hmong found themselves taking on the role of immigrants, adopting new homes around the world. It is with this understanding of Hmong history that one must have to truly know the significance of the Hmong people in Colby's speech.

Colby is better known for giving away the CIA's "family jewels," top level cloak and dagger secrets which included plots to topple foreign governments and schemes of assassination. His importance to Hmong history however, lies in his revelations about the American government's policy position with respect to Laos. What was America doing in Laos, a small count of only three million people, full of mountains and as backward as any third world country?

After two decades, the Hmong are still uncertain as to why the Americans turned to them for help against the communists. The origin of the relationship between the Hmong and the United States can be traced to events that began before 1962 which culminated in the signing of the Geneva Accords.

Before 1962, American, Soviet, Chinese and North Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces were all present in Laos. American policy-makers became concerned with the possibility of military confrontation between the superpowers. To them, the consequences of such an encounter could have disastrous results, as three of the four countries possessed nuclear capabilities.

"President Kennedy and General Secretary Kruschev the Soviet Union had a meeting in 1961," Colby explained. "They both agreed, we were going to have our confrontations. Laos [was] not the place for it. Let's recognize a neutral and independent Laos, withdraw all our military and para-military forces, just leave it alone and leave it out of the equation."

General agreements from that meeting resulted in the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1962. In itself, the primary goal of the Accords was simple and symbolic: it expressed the mutual American and Soviet interest in avoiding possible confrontation in the tiny country by broadly prohibiting all nations from interfering in the affairs of Laos. Specifically, it required all nations to remove non-diplomatic personnel from Laotian soil.

To ensure compliance, Canada, India and Poland were selected to the ICC or International Commission for Supervision and Control of Laos. Its duty: To monitor and report violations of the Accords to the signatory countries.

In theory, the carefully chosen members of the ICC - one communist state (Poland), one American-allied state (Canada) and one supposedly neutral state (India) - was to secure fair and equal representation from the two principle governing/social theories, democracy and communism. One system was not to gain an advantage over the other. In practice however, the United States felt that India leaned favorably toward communism. This bias on India's behalf quickly presented the Americans with a major obstacle.

Pursuant to the agreement, the USSR, China and the United States all withdrew their troops. But when the North Vietnamese dishonored the Accords and removed only forty soldiers from a force of 7,000, American policy-makers faced the first of a series of major dilemmas. As feared, despite obvious breech of international agreement by North Vietnam, the ICC stalled investigations and failed to rigorously enforce treaty conditions. At the same time, the United States could not reintroduce American troops into Laos to force compliance with the Geneva Accords without breaking the treaty themselves. Such a move risked drawing Chinese and Soviet military presence back into Laos.

Keeping with policy, the American government didn't want to risk unnecessary military confrontation with the other two world powers. However, the United States still needed to prevent the North Vietnamese from helping the communist Pathet Lao take over Laos. It was within this global context that forged the alliance between the United States and the Hmong. The 1962 Geneva Accords proscribed the manner in which the Americans could help the Hmong and the type of war the Hmong would be required to fight.

"We began to get the signals in 1962 after the agreement [Geneva Accords] that the North Vietnamese were beginning to move. The were beginning to build up their forces. They were beginning to move out of the area Nam Sam Neau and so forth, down towards the Plain de Jars. They began to push the Hmong around. . .. He [President Kennedy] said: 'CIA, can you provide a little quiet help to the people in Laos who want to fight for their own independence?' and our two officers were in contact with the Hmong," Colby recounted.

"They said, 'Yes, the Hmong want to fight.' They wanted to defend their territory against these North Vietnamese who were beginning to push down into them and that was basically the origin of the [Hmong/CIA] relationship."

American desire to adhere to the spirit of the Geneva Accords deemed it necessary that the Hmong serve as a clandestine force which could harass the North Vietnamese without being directly linked to the United States. The Hmong were prohibited from taking any offensive actions as that could lead to an escalation in the war on the part of the North Vietnamese. Increased fighting also had the potential to expose the American support of the Hmong and could possibly lead to a complete annulment of the Geneva Accords. Colby - then CIA Deputy Director - was instructed by Assistant Secretary W. Averell Harriman of the State Department to keep the effort in Laos purely defensive in nature.

"'Okay, one hundred guns but no attacks, only for defense,' " Colby said of Harriman's orders.

"Don't get the Hmong to do any attack against the North Vietnamese. We don't want to escalate this thing any more than possible, " explained Colby of the American policy in the 1960s. "We would just like to dampen it down where it is ... where we don't let it get any further but we don't try to win any victories there [Laos]."

The need to conceal American involvement in Laos was also substantiated by the testimony of William Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

In October of 1969, Sullivan was questioned by the Counsel Roland A. Paul before a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on the United States's commitment to the Hmong.

Paul asked of Sullivan: "So the presence of American military forces in Laos is not in itself a commitment-generating factor?" "We do not consider that it is a commitment," Sullivan replied. Paul clarified his own question: "Would this means that we could increase our military presence in stages in Laos with the ability to terminate that augmentation at any time?" "I believe that we have that ability currently. In fact, we used to use a rule of thumb our ability to make it reversible and terminate it within eight hours," Sullivan answered. "It would probably take 24 hours now, but it still could be done."

From the very beginning the United States was interested in maintaining the neutrality of Laos. American diplomats negotiated the Geneva Accords in good faith not knowing beforehand that the North Vietnamese would not honor the agreement. Even in supporting Hmong, the United States tried to hold to the spirit of the Accords by discouraging the Hmong from taking the offensive. American forces in Laos were held to 24-hour rule, partly to minimize the chances of detection.

What was the commitment of the United States with respect to the Hmong given the American desire for neutrality?

Sullivan testified in 1969, there was no commitment to the Hmong from day to day. The relationship between the Hmong and the United States served the greater purpose of keeping Laos neutral. The Americans assumed the attitude that the Hmong had lived on this land long enough to defend it against foreign encroachment. According to Colby, from an American policy-making standpoint, the arrangement appeared mutually beneficial.

The United States provided the munitions and general directions but left the decisions up to the Hmong. It was an arrangement that suited the Hmong perfectly Being intensely independent, fighting the war as they saw fit was a level of control that few Hmong leaders had ever experienced before. With American aid, the Hmong advanced rapidly beyond the limits imposed on them by Laotian society. At this basic level of analysis, the relationship served both sides well.

However, given that the secret war in Laos was dictated to be a stalemate by the American interest in preserving the neutrality of Laos, what would have been the fate of the Hmong in Laos if the war had not ended? Since the Hmong were expected to fight a purely defensive war, there was no chance the North Vietnamese would ever be driven out of Laos. The war in Laos could have continued without a final resolution. But by the close of the war in Laos, the age of some of the front-line Hmong troops were starting to dip into the low teens. The estimated casualties sustained by Hmong forces by 1969 was 18,000. From such sobering facts, it is evident that the Hmong could not have sustained a defensive war indefinitely, regardless of US or Hmong desire to continue such a fight.

Colby maintains that the defensive strategy devised by the CIA and employed by the United States was ultimately in the best interest of the Hmong. "I have to say that that was good for Laos, and for the Hmong. You were not subjected to the massive kind of military contest that might have developed otherwise, including the massive destruction that [a major war effort] brings," Colby said.

It will never be known how a full-scale war would have affected the Hmong in Laos. Were more Hmong lives saved because the situation never escalated beyond a minor war in a backward, agrarian country? What did happen was that support from the United States ended with the commencement of the Paris peace talks with the North Vietnamese, Laos fell to communism and the Hmong had no alternatives but to flee in masses.

More than two decades after the war in Laos, the Hmong continue to struggle to understand the war and their role in it. Many in the Hmong community still claim the war could have been won. However, given the limitations placed upon American support, there is little doubt that if the war could have been won by Hmong forces alone, it would have been won at a tremendous cost in Hmong lives. It is about time that the Hmong community know the complete truth about the war in Laos. Knowing the truth will finally allow the older generation to put to rest any feelings that they lost a war. Knowing the truth will give the new generations respect for their people and their origin.

Colby's final remarks reflect many of the American voices who worked with, fought alongside, and died with the tens of thousands of Hmong in Laos: "As an American, I for one am delighted that our country has been strengthen by the addition of people like yourselves. You can be good Hmong and at the same time, you can be good Americans. You can be both," Colby said. "And I think you will be."

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